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NOTE
THE IPHONE JAILBREAKING EXEMPTION AND
THE ISSUE OF OPENNESS
Michael H. Wolk*
The iPhone is a prominent example of an emerging breed of devices
that use technological and legal protections to control the user experi-
ence. Apple locks down the iPhone by adding a gatekeeper in charge of
determining what users can and cannot do with the device. Apple main-
tains that as the creator of the iPhone, it should be able to control the
iPhone OS software, primarily to maintain a consistent user experience.
Innovation advocates counter that, regardless of whether the user experi-
ence is positive for iPhone users, users should be able to choose to jail-
break their iPhones so that they can use their device as they see fit,
instead of being limited to Apple-approved uses. The Digital Millennium
Copyright Act currently reinforces Apple's legal grip on the iPhone OS.
Policymakers interested in innovation should reconsider this results, and
revise the DMCA's anti-circumvention rules accordingly.
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INTRODUCTION
On March 31, 2009, Skype, an online communications company,
released an application for Apple's wildly popular iPhone.1 Skype de-
velops software for computers, stand-alone telephone devices, and mo-
bile devices such as the iPhone that enables Skype users to conduct free
or extremely low-cost phone calls to other Skype users or to landline and
mobile numbers throughout the world.2 Two days after the application
was released, Skype announced that over one million copies of the pro-
gram were downloaded, equivalent to roughly six downloads per sec-
ond.3 Although the high volume of initial downloads suggested
significant interest in the application, there are some limitations to its
operation that may have surprised Skype users. Skype for the iPhone
connects calls only through a Wi-Fi connection cannot route calls over
the phone carrier's wireless data network.4 This means consumers can
place Skype calls through the Wi-Fi network at Starbucks, but they will
not be able to enjoy the same service in locations beyond the short reach
1 Today in Business, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 30, 2009, at B2.
2 See Skype International Calling, http://www.skype.com/prices/callrates (last visited
Mar. 7, 2010).
3 Posting of Peter Parkes to Share Skype Blog, http://share.skype.com/sites/en/2009/04/
skype-foriphonezooms-past-on.html (Apr. 2. 2009) (noting that "Skype for iPhone zooms
past one million downloads").
4 Ryan Kim, App Connects iPhone Users with Skype, S.F. CHRON., Mar. 31, 2009, at
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of a Wi-Fi connection. 5 The obvious question is, why? The answer is
complicated, but the most basic reason is because Apple Inc. (Apple) is
the gatekeeper of all iPhone software and, through legal and technical
methods, the company only permits iPhone users to download Apple-
approved software. 6 While this type of approach provides benefits for
Apple, application developers, and iPhone users, I believe there are nega-
tive aspects of Apple's asserted control.
The introduction of the Skype application, or "app" in Apple's par-
lance, illustrates potential disadvantages of a "walled garden" or "app-
liancized" approach to consumer electronics. 7 A walled garden is a
system where an entity controls as many aspects of a product as possible
and where features are only available if approved by a central authority.
In the case of the iPhone, Apple controls the manufacturing process, the
operating system that runs on the phone, the software used by other par-
ties to develop apps, and the store that serves as the sole conduit for
delivering apps to consumers' phones. 8 From Apple's perspective, man-
aging access to the iPhone is about controlling the quality and consis-
tency of the consumer's experience using the device.9 To this end,
Apple took technological and legal steps to hamper the performance of
certain tasks such as running unapproved apps or allowing consumers to
take advantage of the iPhone operating system (OS) software's underly-
5 See, e.g., FCC Radio Frequency Devices, 47 C.F.R. § 15.249 (2008), available at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/cfrassemble.cgi?title=200847; DANNY BRIERE & PAT HUR-
LEY, WIRELESS NETWORK HACKS & MODS FOR DUMMIES 110 (2005) (noting the relatively
weak strength of Wi-Fi signals).
6 See Apple's Deal with AT&T Follows a 'Walled Garden' Strategy, ECON. TIMEs (In-
dia), July 9, 2008, http://wwwl.economictimes.indiatimes.comlarticleshow/msid-3212643,fl-
stry-l.cms (discussing Apple's model of control for the iPhone and how some experts view
Apple's tight control over the device as a mistake); Chris Foresman, Latest iPhone Developer
Agreement Bans Jailbreaks, ARs TECHNICA, Apr. 1, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/apple/news/
2009/04/latest-iphone-developer-agreement-bans-jailbreaks.ars. But see Yukari Iwatani Kane,
Breaking Apple's Grip on the iPhone, WALL ST. J., Mar. 6, 2009, available at http://online.
wsj.com/article/SB 123629876097346481 .html#.
7 See JONATHAN ZIrAIN, THE FuTuRE OF ThE INTERNET AND HOW TO STOP IT 59-61
(2008) (describing an information appliance as a device which "remains tethered to its maker's
desires, offering a more consistent and focused user experience at the expense of flexibility
and innovation"); Apple's Deal with AT&T Follows a 'Walled Garden' Strategy, supra note 6.
In this Note, I will primarily stick to the walled garden terminology as opposed to the possibly
narrower terminology of information appliances or appliancized hardware as described in
Professor Zittrain's The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It. According to Zittrain, the
term walled garden may just refer to "a lack of interoperability" between systems while "infor-
mation appliances" refers to contemporary tethered technology. E-mail from Jonathan Zit-
train, Professor of Law, Harvard Law School and Kennedy School of Government, to Michael
H. Wolk (Feb. 21, 2010, 00:51 EST) (on file with author).
8 Apple provides information about its App Store online. Apps for iPhone, http://www.
apple.com/iphone/appstore/ (last visited Nov. 19, 2009).
9 See infra note 136 and accompanying text.
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ing UNIX system to compile and run text editors and even web server
software. 10
Apple's strategy for controlling the iPhone includes the use of
software and development contracts or licenses,'1 hardware and software
technologies designed to ensure the iPhone is used only in the manner
prescribed by Apple,' 2 and protections under copyright law. 13 A key
element of Apple's copyright protections is the threat of recourse for
violating the anti-circumvention provisions of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA). 14 The DMCA provides a cause of action, po-
tentially steep fines, and criminal sanctions for defeating a technological
protection measure (TPM) designed to protect access to a protected
work, and it provides sanctions for trafficking in a "technology, product,
service, device, component, or part thereof' that provides access to
works protected by a TPM. 15 Apple argues that the DMCA protects
against a controversial technique known as jailbreaking. 16 Jailbreaking
enables iPhone users to change or modify the operating system running
10 I do not know why a user would want to run software such as the open-source Apache
web server or Vim (a classic text editing program) on the tiny, low-powered iPhone other than
to prove it is possible. Web server software is more typically run on computer systems with
higher-performance hardware than that available on a laptop or portable computing device like
the iPhone. Regardless, hackers were able to do so no later than July 25, 2007. Chad
Shmukler, Hacked iPhone Now Running Apache, Python, Vim, IPHONEFAQ.oRG, July 25,
2007, http://www.iphonefaq.org/archives/97212.
11 See, e.g., APPLE INC., IPHONE SoF-ARE LICENSE AGREEMENT (2009), http://images.
apple.comlegal/sla/docs/iphone.pdf (describing restrictions on the consumers' use of the
iPhone including a prohibition of modifying, reverse-engineering, and otherwise creating de-
rivative works using the iPhone OS software). Also, the "iPhone Developer Program License
Agreement" limits how a developer may use Apple's development products to produce apps.
The license is not publicly available on Apple's site, however, one version is referenced in a
news piece describing the addition of terms banning the act of jailbreaking as well as selling
applications for jailbroken phones. Foresman, supra note 6. This Note does not explore the
implications of the contracts and licenses ("Agreements") that bind iPhone owners and devel-
opers. Whether or not copyright law precludes the jailbreaking behavior discussed herein,
there remain issues with the Agreements and other laws. For example, it is possible that a
court might find jailbreaking to be a violation of the Agreements. On the other hand, the
Agreements could potentially be preempted by copyright law. This Note's narrow scope, the
implications of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act on jailbreaking, does not attempt to
answer the wider question of whether jailbreaking violates any United States laws or the
Agreements.
12 See infra Part I.B (discussing the iPhone TPMs).
13 See infra Part II (discussing the history and current applications of the DMCA).
14 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2006).
15 Id. § 1201(a)(2). A civil cause of action for defeating a TPM is available in 17 U.S.C.
§ 1203, and 17 U.S.C. § 1204 provides for criminal sanctions. See 17 U.S.C. § 1203 (2006)
(Defining civil remedies for violations of §§ 1201 and 1202); 17 U.S.C. § 1204 (2006)
(Describing criminal penalties for certain willful violations of §§ 1201 and 1202). Section
1201(a)(2) is one of the DMCA's anti-trafficking provisions, and § 1201(a)(l)(A) provides the
actual ban on the circumvention of a TPM. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2); 17 U.S.C.
§ 1201(a)(1)(A).
16 See infra notes 153 to 155 and accompanying text.
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on the iPhone so that it is capable of performing tasks and running other
software (such as a full-featured version of Skype) regardless of Apple's
approval. 17
While some commentators have argued that Apple's DMCA claims
are quite weak,' 8 this Note argues, despite my preference for permitting
tinkering, that Apple will be able to rely on the DMCA to provide legal
muscle in support of the iPhone's tethered control. This Note aims to
examine the ongoing dispute over the legality of jailbreaking and to use
this dispute to discuss some of the negative implications of today's
DMCA policy. Part I presents background information on the use of
TPMs, as well as a specific discussion of the protections employed on
the iPhone. Part II examines the DMCA and the anti-circumvention
rules. Part III analyzes the ongoing anti-circumvention waiver applica-
tion for jailbreaking devices including the iPhone. Part IV steps back
and analyzes how the DMCA has been and is likely to be applied, as well
as the greater implications of this policy.
I. PROTECTION MEASURES
A. Brief History of Copy Restrictions
There is a long history of copyright holders working to prevent the
electronic reproduction of their works. In the 1980s, a piece of hardware
commonly referred to as a dongle was used as a key for unlocking
software.19 Dongle-protected software would not run on a computer un-
less the dongle was attached to one of the machine's ports. 20 Software
licenses were sold with a single dongle, and this scheme made it difficult
to run copied software on multiple machines since the software would
only run if the dongle was connected to the computer.21
Similar attempts at copy control have been used for audio and video
media. For example, technologies such as analog copy protection (ACP)
prevent or distort the copying of protected content on the VHS format. 22
17 Id.
18 Kane, supra note 6; see infra note 175.
19 Microprocessor for Executing Enciphered Programs, U.S. Patent No. 4,168,396 (filed
Sept. 18, 1979); see BRUCE SCHNEIER, SECRETS & LIES: DIGrrAL SECURITY IN A NETWORKED
WORLD 251 (2000); J.D. Biersdorfer, Q & A; The Mystery of the Dongle, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15,
1998, at G4.
20 SCHNEIER, supra note 19, at 251.
21 See generally id. at 251-53 (describing how the dongle functions as a copy protection
mechanism).
22 See Rovi ACP Guide, http://www.rovicorp.com/products/content-producers/protect/
acp.htm (last visited Nov. 22, 2009). Once, unaware of ACP, I spent a long afternoon during
eighth grade creating a compilation of short clips from Alfred Hitchcock films for a class
presentation on the director. The ACP made the images on the VHS tape compilation oscillate
in degrees of brightness.
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More recently, record companies attempted to block compact disc copy-
ing by using copy protection technology. 23
Today, companies commonly use as a means of protecting digital
audio and video files sold over the internet. For example, Apple utilizes
a type of TPM called FairPlay to regulate the use of audio files it sells
through its iTunes store.2 4 FairPlay-protected music can be played on
Apple's iPod music players, on a limited number of authorized com-
puters, and can be burned onto compact discs a limited number of
times.25 The iPhone, too, is capable of playing FairPlay-protected
tracks.26
B. iPhone TPMs and Protections
Besides supporting protected media files, the iPhone has many lay-
ers of TPMs designed to control or prevent certain uses of the device,
including two protections that are most relevant to this discussion.2 7
First, the iPhone uses a technique called code signing as a part of a TPM
designed to ensure that everything from the iPhone OS to the apps loaded
on the phone have not been modified in any way.2 8 Second, the iPhone
OS is encrypted by Apple, and cannot be run on any device, including
the iPhone, without being decrypted first. 29 The first sub-section will
discuss these TPMs and how they are used on the iPhone. The following
sub-section will discuss some common techniques used to modify the
23 CD copy prevention gained some notoriety after Sony BMG released over fifty differ-
ent CD titles containing technology that unintentionally left Windows-based computers vulner-
able to computer viruses. See Edward W. Felten & J. Alex Halderman, Digital Rights
Management, Spyware, and Security, IEEE SECURITY & PRivACY, Jan.-Feb. 2006, at 18-23
(describing Sony's copy protection technology).
24 Steve Jobs, Apple's CEO, posted an essay on February 6, 2007, describing Apple's
current use of its FairPlay technology, and the resulting complications stemming from its use.
Steve Jobs, Thoughts on Music, APPLE.COM, Feb. 6, 2007, http://www.apple.com/hotnews/
thoughtsonmusic/.
25 About iTunes Store Authorization and Deauthorization, http://support.apple.comlkbl
HT1420 (last visited Nov. 22, 2009) (explaining the authorization process for protected
media).
26 Apple iPhone Technical Specifications, http://www.apple.com/iphone/specs.html (last
visited Nov. 22, 2009) (describing ability to play protected AAC files, also known as FairPlay-
protected M4P files).
27 This section will use the term TPM when referring to technical methods of restricting
use of the iPhone device. While the definition of TPM is specific in the DMCA, part of the
dispute addressed here depends on whether certain protections are actually TPMs protected by
the DMCA. The term TPM is used here for the sake of simplicity, and its use is in no way an
attempt to provide passive support for Apple's position. See infra Part I.B (discussing the
iPhone's TPMs).
28 FRED VON LOHMANN & JENNIFER S. GRANICK, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION,
COMMENT: IN THE MATrER OF EXEMPTION TO PROHIBITION ON CIRCUMVENTION OF COPYRIGHT
PROTECTION SYSTEMS FOR AccEss CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES 7 (2008), available at http://
www.copyfight.gov/1201/2008/comments/lohmann-fred.pdf [hereinafter EFF COMMENT].
29 Id.
THE IPHONE JAILBREAKING ExEMPTION
iPhone and defeat these TPMs and how these changes impact the opera-
tion of the iPhone device.
1. Integrity Through Code Signing
To ensure that it runs Apple-approved apps only, the iPhone incor-
porates a practice called code signing. Each app downloaded from the
app store is code signed by Apple. Code signing uses a mathematical
technique 30 to ensure that the app in use was distributed by Apple and
that it has not been modified in any way.31 While no computer authenti-
cation or security technique is foolproof, code signing is considered to be
extremely reliable and is used in most modem operating systems. 32
Since code signing on its own is a method for testing data integrity, the
iPhone' s OS uses this technique to enforce a policy of only running prop-
erly signed apps. Every time a user attempts to run an app, the iPhone's
OS performs an S-Check to enforce this policy. The S-Check functions
as a gatekeeper that only runs an app if the S-Check can verify the App
code's integrity through code signing in order to confirm the code was
signed by Apple and was not subsequently modified.33 Through the S-
Check, Apple maintains its policy of control over the functionality of the
iPhone by ensuring that consumers can only use Apple-approved apps.
2. Encryption
Portions of the iPhone OS are encrypted. 34 When an OS is stored in
an encrypted form, its storage makes the software unusable and indeci-
pherable until it has been decrypted back to its usable form. A simple
analogy would be if one were to encrypt this Note. One could re-order
every word (or letter) until the Note became an apparently meaningless
30 Code signing uses cryptographic hash functions. For a given hash function, and a
given input, the resulting value is a constant. Any change in the input will lead to a different
output. Because of these properties, a code signing technique can be used where a particular
piece of software is used as the input for a hash function, and the output value is made availa-
ble to the public on the producer's website or through some other means of public distribution.
Savvy computer users can then run their copy of the software through the same hash function
to ensure that their output value matches the official value. By using this method, a computer
user can ensure they are using an unmodified version of the software. For a longer overview
and useful sources, see JOHN VmGA ET AL., NETWORK SECURITY WITH OPENSSL 192-95
(2002) (discussing hash functions).
31 For a quick overview and some helpful sources, see SCHNEIER, supra note 19, at 163.
32 See APPLE INC., MAC DEV CENTER, CODE SIGNING GUIDE (2009), available at http://
developer.apple.com/mac/library/documentation/Security/Conceptual/CodeSigningGuide/
CodeSigningGuide.pdf (offering a pared-down explanation of code signing, and how the tech-
nique is used in Apple's Mac OS X operating system).
33 The iPhone Dev Team produced a video explaining the jailbreaking process it uses in
the software it releases. Internet Video: 25C3: Hacking the iPhone, http://video.google.com/
videoplay?docid=713763707060529304 [hereinafter Dev Team Video].
34 See id. (stating that the kernel, a high-level component of the iPhone OS, is stored in
an encrypted form on the iPhone's NAND flash memory).
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series of alpha-numeric symbols. If one wished to then edit or under-
stand the encrypted Note, one would have to decrypt, or reorder, the
words first so that they could be understood. For jailbreaking the iPhone,
the primary impact of iPhone OS encryption is that the operating system
cannot be usefully modified until it is understood, and it cannot be under-
stood until it is first decrypted.
3. Defeating TPMs and Running Non-Apple Approved Apps
There is more than one way to modify an iPhone in order to run
outside apps. This section will focus on a jailbreaking technique used by
a non-Apple-affiliated group called "iPhone Dev Team. '35 Much of the
work performed by this group focuses on enabling the iPhone to run any
program the user wants, 36 often by finding ways to defeat the S-Check.
Methods for defeating S-Check can be divided between those that
rely on updateable iPhone OS software and those that rely on immutable
hardware. 37 For software-based attacks, 38 one can take advantage of vul-
nerabilities or holes in the way the iPhone OS operates, bypass the S-
Check process, and successfully run the desired software. 39 A problem
with this type of exploit is that once a hole is discovered, Apple can fix it
in a new version of the operating system. It may take a lot of time to
research and find these errors, and so a battle ensues between the party
trying to control (Apple) and those users who wish to break free of these
restrictions. 40 Because Apple can patch software exploits, defeating S-
Check in this manner becomes an exercise in futility.
35 See Dev-Team Blog, http://blog.iphone-dev.org/ (last visited Mar. 14, 2010). Some
will refer to groups like iPhone Dev Team as hacker groups or hackers. The reason for doing
so is based on negative connotations that are sometimes associated with the term hack. For
example, the EFF, who supports a jailbreaking exemption, does not describe the activities as
hacks or the participants as hackers. See EFF COMMENT, supra note 28. Apple, on the other
hand, opposes the proposed exemption and has used these terms in order to suggest that the
associated acts are dirty or illegal. See APPLE COMMENT, infra note 120. This is an unfortu-
nate reality especially considering that today's hackers can also be viewed as the modem
version of the previous generations of tinkerers who were just interested in how things work.
36 See Dev-Team Blog, supra note 35. The Dev Team provides information and
software so that iPhone users can continue to run the latest official version of Apple's iPhone
OS with modifications so they can run apps and other code from any source they choose. Id.
37 Defining what constitutes hardware versus software is not always straightforward, in
part, because much of what can be accomplished using hardware can also be achieved through
software. See, e.g., ZrrrRAni, supra note 7, at 13-14 (comparing hard-wired hardware to
software and noting that much of what can be embedded in hardware can also be achieved
through software).
38 The term attack might evoke thoughts of violence, however, its use here is meant
solely to describe methodologies for changing software's functionality.
39 The specific exploit is not important and could be a stack overflow or similar code
injection technique. See Dev Team Video, supra note 33.
40 A good example of this battle is an exploit purportedly used by a software company to
allow users to install third-party apps on iPhones. The exploit worked through a vulnerability
in the iPhone image processing software. The software, when reading an image, could be
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As an alternative, groups such as iPhone Dev Team embraced a
method that avoids this battle by exploiting the design of the iPhone's
hardware instead of the more dynamic software.4 1 Although Apple can
update much of the iPhone OS to fix vulnerabilities, it cannot easily
modify how the iPhone's hardware and low-level code operates. 42 As a
result, exploits that rely on vulnerabilities at the hardware level avoid the
back-and-forth fighting that occurs with exploits at the software level.43
One popular hardware-based method for overcoming the S-Check
for apps is by undermining the S-Check early in the startup process. Ap-
ple protects the S-Check, which runs closer to the "surface" of the
software by requiring successive code-checks by programs running
"deeper" in the startup process. 44 Figure I diagrams the succession of
programs that initiate when a user powers on the iPhone: SecureBoot
must load the LLB, the LLB must load iBoot, iBoot must load the Ker-
nel, and the Kernel is the program responsible for loading/running
apps.45
FIGURE 1
The padlocks in Figure I affixed to Apps, Kernel, and iBoot show
that those programs will function only if each passes a code signing
check demonstrating the program's integrity. 46  This type of security
tricked into running code hidden in the image file. The code hidden in the image bypassed the
S-Chek, and made it possible to run unauthorized third-party apps on the iPhone. Once Ap-
ple fixed the image reading program in future versions of the iPhone OS, this vulnerability
could not be exploited. See DAVID JURICK ET AL., IPHONE HACKS 8 (2008) (describing the
back and forth as a cat-and-mouse scenario); Deconstructing the iPhone SDK: Malware, http://
mikeash.com/?page=pyblog/deconstructing-the-iphone-sdk-malware.html (Mar. 20, 2008,
16:58).
41 See Dev Team Video, supra note 33.
42 See id.
43 See JURICK Er AL., supra note 40, at 15; Cat. Bag. Mouse., http://blog.iphone-dev.org/
post/92185631/cat-bag-mouse (Apr. 2, 2009) (discussing how once a particular version of
iPhone hardware is jailbroken, there is minimal difficulty in jailbreaking the device in the
future because software updates do not impact the underlying vulnerability).
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scheme is known as a circle-of-trust model.47 The reason someone seek-
ing to run a third-party app cannot modify the Kernel to remove the S-
Check is because the Kernel itself will not run unless the iBoot program
has confirmed its integrity.48 Similarly, the iBoot will not run unless the
LLB first checks its integrity. This leads us to the hole in this chain.
Although the LLB checks the integrity of the iBoot, no program checks
the integrity of the LLB.49 This makes it possible to modify the LLB so
that it no longer checks the iBoot prior to its execution.50 Once this
occurs, the iBoot can also be modified. The Kernel can then be changed
to disable S-Check and open the gate so that the iPhone will run apps or
other code without any integrity check.51
While every detail of these exploits is not critical to the discussion,
it is important to understand that there are many ways to enable the
iPhone to run third-party apps. By defeating integrity checks at multiple
levels, the method described above opens up the iPhone to running unof-
ficial apps, as well as code that could compromise device security and
other features designed to limit the impact of hardware malfunctions. 52
One final important detail is that each app sold through Apple's store is
wrapped with a TPM designed to prevent iPhone users from using apps
that they find elsewhere online or get from a friend (i.e. pirated apps).53
These protections remain after jailbreaking; however, online software ex-
ists to remove this TPM from apps.54 Once the protection is removed,
these stripped apps can be run on any jailbroken iPhone, but not on un-
modified devices.
4. Summary
Apple's use of TPMs on the iPhone follows in the footsteps of ear-
lier copy protection technologies. Jailbreaking not only makes it possi-
ble to run unapproved apps, but it also opens the door for the installation
and use of pirated copies of official apps for sale in the iTunes App
Store.55 The iPhone OS is not designed to distinguish between pirated
apps and non-Apple-approved apps. Once the S-Check is removed, the
47 See CRICKET Liu & PAUL ALBrrz, DNS AND BIND 330 (5th ed. 2006) (describing use
of chain-of-trust model in the context of securing DNS key-value pairs).




52 See infra note 138 and accompanying text (discussing arguments for protecting the
iPhone).
53 See Erica Sadun, App Store DRM Cracked, but What's the Point?, ARs TECHNICA,
Feb. 2, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/apple/news/2009/02/poetic-justice-watch-crackulous-re-
leased-pirated-re-sold.ars.
54 Id.
55 See infra note 138 (noting that jailbroken phones are often used for piracy purposes).
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iPhone OS only distinguishes between apps from Apple, which arrive
protected by a TPM tying the app to its purchaser, and those without
such protections.5 6 Thus, to take advantage of pirated apps, a consumer
must have access to an unprotected version of the app (stripped of Ap-
ple's tying TPM) 57 and a jailbroken iPhone that does not check the integ-
rity of apps, using S-Check, prior to their execution. 58
II. DMCA
A. History
The contemporary copyright environment is one where many analog
products such as books, VHS tapes, records, cassette tapes, and others
have been supplanted by digital media such as e-books, compact discs
(CDs), digital versatile discs (DVDs), and digital audio and video files.
Unlike copies made from analog media, a digital copy is a perfect
copy. 59 Thus, with digital copying, copies made from other copies have
the same quality as the original digital file. 60
Digital copy prevention technology may serve as an example of a
tangible response to media owners' fears of digital copying and piracy.
These TPMs can be applied to control the use of audio and video files
sold or licensed to consumers through online stores.61 For example, a
consumer is limited to playing protected audio files from Apple's iTunes
Store on a set number of computers and digital media players made by
Apple. 62 Similarly, video files such as television episodes and movies
are often wrapped with a TPM designed to limit the number of viewings
and the types of devices that can access the content. 63 A key problem
with TPMs is that users can defeat these technologies, enabling unen-
cumbered distribution of previously protected content. 64 In response to
the threat of digital copying, Congress passed the DMCA in hopes of
56 See Sadun, supra note 53.
57 Id.
58 See JURICK ET AL., supra note 40, at 14 (discussing the ability to use numerous third-
party applications on jailbroken iPhones); Sadun, supra note 53.
59 See H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 1, at 9 (1998) [hereinafter DMCA H.R. REP. I] (dis-
cussing the background and need for legislation).
60 But see Kevin Kelly, Where Music Will Be Coming from, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2002,
(Magazine), at 30.
61 Apple's iTunes Music Store is considered one of the first consumer-grade online
stores capable of selling digital media while giving copyright holders the ability to control the
use of protected audio files.
62 See Jobs, supra note 24 (noting that music files protected using Apple's FairPlay TPM
may be played on 5 computers and an unlimited number of iPods).
63 See iTunes Store Movie Rental Usage Rights in the United States, http://support.apple.
com/kb/HT1415 (last visited Feb. 28, 2010).
64 See Felten & Halderman, supra note 23, at 18-23.
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providing a legal process to return control to the owners of copyrighted
works.65
B. The Act
The DMCA's anti-circumvention provisions make it illegal to by-
pass TPMs designed to protect copyrighted content. 66 Specifically,
§ 1201(a)(1)(A) provides: "No person shall circumvent a technological
measure that effectively controls access to a work protected under this
title."'67 The remainder of § 1201 defines relevant terms and provides
specific exceptions to the DMCA's anti-circumvention rules whereby a
TPM may be defeated without incurring liability. The act defines cir-
cumventing protections afforded by a technological measure as, "avoid-
ing, bypassing, removing, deactivating, or otherwise impairing a
technological measure." 68 Further, "a technological measure 'effectively
protects a right of a copyright owner under this title' if the measure, in
the ordinary course of its operation, prevents, restricts, or otherwise lim-
its the exercise of a right of a copyright owner under this title." 69 Thus, a
key element to the validity of a TPM is whether it is truly protecting an
underlying copyright.70
In addition to prohibiting the act of circumvention, the DMCA bans
trafficking in products that are primarily used for circumventing a
TPM.71 Although individuals, sitting in the privacy of their homes, can
circumvent a TPM, the anti-trafficking prohibition targets more public
behaviors: "No person shall manufacture, import, offer to the public, pro-
vide, or otherwise traffic in any technology, product, service, device,
component, or part thereof .... -72
The remainder of this anti-trafficking provision defines the prohib-
ited products or services. 73 The scope of the banned products is those
with "only limited commercially significant purpose or use other than to
65 See DMCA H.R. REP. I, supra note 59, at 9-11.
66 See id. at 14.
67 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2006).
68 Id. § 1201(b)(2)(A).
69 Id. § 1201(b)(2)(B).
70 This issue can be rather confusing because of the many ways computer code may be
used in digital devices. See, e.g., Davidson & Assocs. v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 640-41 (8th Cir.
2005) (citing Lexmark v. Static Control Components, 387 F.3d 522, 546 (6th Cir. 2004) (find-
ing an authentication sequence contained on printer cartridge chips is not a TPM protecting
access to Lexmark's "Toner Load Program" and its "Printer Engine Program")); Chamberlain
Group, Inc. v. Skylink Techs., Inc., 381 F.3d 1178, 1203-04 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (holding that a
company specializing in replacement garage door openers did not violate the DMCA in dis-
tributing a replacement opener compatible with Chamberlain doors).
71 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2).
72 Id.
73 Id. § 1201 (a)(2)(A)-(C) (describing two classes of goods or services that would vio-
late the DMCA).
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circumvent a [TPM] . '74 The legislative record shows that this section
was aimed at "black box" circumvention technology75 the purpose of
which is primarily the circumvention of TPMs.76 Furthermore, the re-
cord states that anti-trafficking language is not aimed at "products that
are capable of commercially significant non[-]infringing uses, such as
consumer electronics, telecommunications, and computer products-in-
cluding videocassette recorders, telecommunications switches, personal
computers, and servers-used by businesses and consumers for perfectly
legitimate purposes."
77
C. DMCA Exemption Process
The DMCA has been criticized for its broad protections and for
prohibiting uses of copyrighted works that would otherwise be legal if
the works were not protected by the act.78 For example, a film professor
may wish to take clips from several films on DVD and bum them onto a
single disc for quick presentation during class time. 79 While such an act
is likely fair use, the necessary circumvention of the DVD's TPM would
be a violation of the DMCA. In an attempt to soften these potentially
harsh results, § 1201(a)(1)(C) provides for a notice and comment
rulemaking process for exemptions to the DMCA's anti-circumvention
rules. The statute provides several factors for the Library of Congress to
consider when evaluating whether to grant a particular request:
i. the availability for use of copyrighted works;
74 Id. § 1201(a)(2)(B).
75 Examples of cases involving "black box" technologies include DVD circumvention
products as well as chips and other devices used to circumvent TPMs designed to ensure that
video game systems will not play pirated games. Sony Computer Entm't Am., Inc. v. Filipiak,
406 F. Supp. 2d 1068, 1076-77 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (finding defendant liable for trafficking
devices designed to modify Sony's Playstation video game hardware in order to circumvent a
TPM preventing the use of copied games); 321 Studios v. Metro Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc.,
307 F. Supp. 2d 1085, 1099 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (holding that 321 Studios' DVD Copy Plus
program violated the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA).
76 H.R. REP. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 38 (1998).
77 Id. See generally Posting of Sarah McBride & Yukari Iwatani Kane to Digits, http://
blogs.wsj.com/digits/2009/04/24/realnetworks-and-hollywood-spar-over-dvd-ripping/tab/arti-
cle/ (Apr. 24, 2009, 04:11 EST) (demonstrating that the line between so-called "black box"
infringement devices and the second class of permitted products is not nearly as crystal clear
as it was believed when the DMCA was enacted).
78 See Steven P. Calandrillo & Ewa M. Davison, The Dangers of the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act: Much Ado About Nothing?, 50 WM. & MARY L. REv. 349, 350 (2008).
79 This specific issue was addressed in 2006 (and mentioned in the Calandrillo &
Davison article, supra note 78), and the Library of Congress granted an exemption because
otherwise it would be a violation of the DMCA because of the content scrambling system
(CSS) protections used to protect DVD content. MARYBETH PETERS, U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
RECOMMENDATION OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS IN RM 2005-11: RULEMAKING ON EX-
EMPTIONS FROM PROHIBITION ON CIRCUMVENTON OF COPYRIGHT PROTECTION SYSTEMS FOR
ACCESS CONTROL TECHNOLOGIES 1 (2006), available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/docs/
1201_recommendation.pdf [hereinafter 2006 RECOMMENDATION].
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ii. the availability for use of works for nonprofit archival, preserva-
tion, and educational purposes;
iii. the impact that the prohibition on the circumvention of techno-
logical measures applied to copyrighted works has on criticism,
comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or research;
iv. the effect of circumvention of technological measures on the
market for or value of copyrighted works; and
v. such other factors as the Librarian considers appropriate. 80
The Library of Congress has conducted three rulemakings. A fourth
rulemaking, while due at the end of 2009, has not yet been promulgated
at the time this note went to press in 2010.81 In the most recent 2006
rulemaking, the Library announced the exemption of six classes of copy-
righted works from the protections provided by the DMCA. 82 These
classes include exemptions for media studies and film professors who
want to circumvent protections on certain audiovisual works in order to
make compilations for the classroom, 83 and also for any person who uses
computer programs for the sole purpose of unlocking mobile
telephones.84
III. JAILBREAKING EXEMPTION
This Part discusses an exemption recently proposed by the Elec-
tronic Frontier Foundation (EFF). In the current 2008-2010 rulemaking,
the EFF proposed renewal of the exemption for unlocking mobile tele-
phones discussed in the previous Part of this Note.85 Additionally, it
proposed an exemption that encompasses the activities necessary to jail-
80 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)(i)-(v) (2006). In the 2006 Recommendation, the Librarian
explained that the additional factors referred to in the fifth paragraph "require the Register to
carefully balance the availability of works for use, the effect of the prohibition on particular
use and the effect of circumvention on copyrighted works." 2006 RECOMMENDATION, supra
note 79, at 5.
81 The U.S. Copyright Office, Rulemaking on Exemptions from Prohibition on Circum-
vention of Technological Measures that Control Access to Copyrighted Works, http://www.
copyright.gov/1201/ (last visited Nov. 23, 2009).
82 Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copyright Protection Systems for Ac-
cess Control Technologies, 71 Fed. Reg. 68,472, 68,472 (Nov. 27, 2006) (to be codified at 37
C.F.R. pt. 201).
83 Id. at 68,473-74.
84 Id. at 68,476; see, e.g., John Haubenreich, The iPhone and the DMCA: Locking the
Hands of Consumers, 61 VArrD. L. REv 1507, 1513 (2008) (discussing the DMCA exemption
for unlocking mobile devices and the current 2008-2009 rulemaking). It is not entirely clear
whether the 2006 phone unlocking exemption is an anomaly resulting from the mobile phone
industry's failure to file their comments on time or whether the Library of Congress will renew
the exemption in 2009 having had the chance to review arguments on both sides this time.
85 See infra Part I].A.
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break an iPhone for the purposes of running unapproved software pro-
grams, such as third-party apps.86
The EFF proposed a new class of exempted copyrighted works:
"computer programs that enable wireless telephone handsets to execute
lawfully obtained software applications, where circumvention is accom-
plished for the sole purpose of enabling interoperability of such applica-
tions with computer programs on the telephone handset. '8 7 This Part
will review the EFF's arguments in favor of this exemption, Apple's
claims against such a grant, and other arguments that provide further
perspective on this issue. Apple's and the EFF's comments discuss the
applicability of 17 U.S.C. § 117, fair use, and the weight of the anti-
circumvention factors listed in § 1201(a)(1)(C). As a result, the follow-
ing discussion will focus primarily on these three areas while attempting
to provide a meaningful account of each side's overall argument.
A. Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF)
EFF describes itself as a member-supported non-profit with an in-
terest in seeking a balance to copyright laws in order to protect the inter-
ests of copyright owners and the public. 88 For this exemption, The EFF
broadly argued that "there is no copyright-related rationale for prevent-
ing iPhone owners from decrypting and modifying the device's firmware
in order to enable their phones to interoperate with applications lawfully
obtained from a source of their own choosing." 89 The EFF presented
three arguments for why jailbreaking does not actually infringe a
copyright.
1. Jailbreaking Methods Vary
First, it argued that some types of jailbreaking do not violate the
software license because the methods do not involve decrypting, modify-
ing, or creating a derivative work of the iPhone OS. 90 The EFF admits
that some modifications do require decrypting the iPhone OS, but argues
it is not clear whether these acts constitute a modification in violation of
the license agreement or whether the addition of code without changing
86 See id.
87 EFF CoararuN, supra note 28, at 1. The wording here is interesting given that this
language would not extend to devices like the iPod Touch which appears functionally
equivalent to the iPhone, but lacks built-in telephone capabilities. Compare iPod Touch Tech-
nical Specifications, http://www.apple.com/ipodtouch/specs.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2010)
and iPhone Technical Specifications, http://www.apple.com/iphone/specs.html (last visited
Apr. 12, 2010).
88 Id.
89 Id. at 5.
90 See id. at 8.
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any of the programs that make up the iPhone OS is just "using the
iPhone" as authorized in the software license agreement. 91
2. Section 117
Secondly, the EFF argued that under 17 U.S.C. § 117, it is permissi-
ble for iPhone owners to adapt their legally obtained copies of the iPhone
OS so long as the changes do not, "harm the interests of the copyright
proprietor. '9 2 The EFF maintains that Krause v. Titleserv, Inc.93 pro-
vides an analogous example of a license-holder being permitted to mod-
ify licensed software in order to adapt it to meet current business needs. 94
3. Fair Use
Thirdly, the EFF argued that the use at issue falls within the fair use
exception defined in 17 U.S.C. § 107. Under § 107, a court should con-
sider the following fair use factors:
i. the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
ii. the nature of the copyrighted work;
iii. the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
iv. the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the
copyrighted work. 95
With regard to these factors, the EFF insisted some weigh in its
favor while others do not fit into this particular analysis.96 It argued that
the first factor weighs in favor of fair use since jailbreaking is a noncom-
mercial, private act by individual users.97
91 See id. One could perhaps view this distinction analogously using a jelly bean hypo-
thetical. First, imagine a handful of red jelly beans. If someone were to add a few blue jelly
beans without taking away any red, is the handful still a handful of red jelly beans or have the
blue turned it into something new? The EFF is arguing that adding a few blue jelly beans is
not a modification since all of the red beans are still in the handful. If an operating system is
viewed as a collection of programs, and someone adds a few additional items to this grouping,
it is not entirely clear whether this constitutes a modification since no individual program is
changed.
92 EFF COMMENT, supra note 28, at 9 (citing Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119,
127-29 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that Titleserv, which paid Krause to develop computer pro-
grams for its sole benefit, was exempted, through 17 U.S.C. § 107(a), from copyright liability
for modifying some of Krause's programs to address bugs, adapt the programs for use with
Microsoft Windows, and add new capabilities that made the software more responsive to
Titleserv's business needs)).
93 402 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2005).
94 See EFF COMMEr, supra note 28, at 9 (citing Krause, 402 F.3d at 127-29).
95 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
96 See EFF COMMENT, supra note 28, at 9.
97 See id.
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Without specific citations, the EFF stated that the second and third
factors are of reduced importance in cases involving private, noncom-
mercial uses. 98 For the second factor, it noted that courts have found fair
use in cases of software modification even though such modification re-
quires copying both the functional and creative elements of the iPhone
OS software. 99
For the fourth factor, the EFF explained that the relevant work is the
iPhone OS and notes that it is not sold separately from the iPhone hard-
ware and is available for free on Apple's website. 100 Based on these
facts, the EFF argued that the iPhone OS has no independent economic
value except for its use on the iPhone, and if users learn they can jail-
break iPhones to run third-party software, demand for the iPhone, and
thus the iPhone OS, will only increase. 10 1
The EFF concluded by noting that while any of the three arguments
presented should be sufficient to demonstrate that jailbreaking is non-
infringing, it is possible for changes in the specific facts to alter the out-
come of these arguments. 10 2 Perhaps because of the factual dependence
of this type of inquiry, the EFF stated that "[g]ranting an exemption to
§ 1201(a)(1)'s circumvention prohibition is the proper way to permit
non-infringing uses of jailbroken iPhones while affording courts the op-
portunity to reach undecided issues. ' 103
4. Section 1201(a)(1)(C) Factors
After making its three arguments, the EFF discussed the
§ 1201(a)(1)(C) factors and how they relate to the proposed jailbreaking
exemption. For the first factor,1°4 the availability for use of copyrighted
works, the EFF made an argument analogous to the fourth factor argu-
ment under the fair use doctrine. 10 5 It argued that since the iPhone OS
has no economic value independent from the iPhone hardware, and since
allowing people to jailbreak will likely increase demand, then the availa-
bility of such firmware will be enhanced because of increased demand
for the iPhone and its underlying software. 10 6 Citing the 2006 rulemak-
ing, the EFF stated, "the software locks that prevent phone owners from
98 See id. at 10.
99 See id. (citing Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1524-26 (9th Cir.
1993)).
100 See id. at 9.
101 See id.
102 See EFF ComMENT, supra note 28, at 9.
103 Id. In other words, if the exemption were granted, parties with fair uses could then
proceed with those uses without the risk of violating the DMCA anti-circumvention cause of
action.
104 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)(i) (2006); see supra note 80 and accompanying text.
1O5 See EFF CoMMErNT, supra note 28, at 10-11.
106 See id. at 11 (citing 2006 RECOMMENDATION, supra note 79, at 52).
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running software of their choosing are not intended to protect the market
for copyrighted firmware-instead, these software locks are intended to
'control the use of hardware which, as is increasingly the case, may be
operated in part through the use of computer software or firmware."' 10 7
Along these lines, it continues to argue that while it does not believe the
iPhone's availability will be harmed, consumers will be harmed because
they lack an alternative for running third-party apps on their devices. 10 8
For the second factor, 1°9 the availability for use of works for non-
profit archival, preservation, and educational purposes, the EFF briefly
stated that it is unlikely that jailbreaking will impact the availability of
the iPhone OS for the respective uses listed in this factor.110
For the third factor,11' the impact on criticism, comment, news re-
porting, teaching, scholarship, or research, the EFF argued that while the
inability to jailbreak smartphones may impact the listed uses, the grant-
ing of an exemption for jailbreaking would not have an adverse
impact. 112
For the fourth factor,1 13 the effect on the market for, or value of,
copyrighted works, the EFF again argued that the market for the iPhone
OS will not be adversely impacted. 114 Besides repeating its argument
that demand for the iPhone and iPhone OS will increase if jailbreaking is
permitted, the EFF also addressed concerns that jailbreaking will impact
the TPMs used to protect audio-visual media and apps. 115 The EFF
pointed out that the TPMs used to protect media, as well as the technol-
ogy used to prevent copying of apps from Apple's official store, are in no
way impacted by jailbreaking. 116 Those protections are separate; and the
jailbreaking process does not involve tampering with those TPMs. 117
The EFF concluded its argument by quoting a passage from the
2006 Recommendation of the Register of Copyrights:
[W]hen application of the prohibition on circumvention
of access controls would offer no apparent benefit to the
author or copyright owner in relation to the work to
which access is controlled, but simply offers a benefit to
a third-party who may use § 1201 to control the use of
107 Id. (citing 2006 RECOMMENDATION, supra note 79, at 52).
108 See id.
109 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)(ii); see supra note 80 and accompanying text.
110 See EFF COMMENT, supra note 28, at 11.
111 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)(iii); see supra note 80 and accompanying text.
112 See EFF COMMENT, supra note 28, at 11.
113 See supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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hardware which, as is increasingly the case, may be op-
erated in part through the use of computer software or
firmware, an exemption may well be warranted.1 18
The EFF argued that this comment, taken from the Register of Cop-
yright's recommendation supporting the currently enacted mobile phone
unlocking exemption, should apply in the jailbreaking context. 119
B. Apple
Unsurprisingly, Apple made a forceful argument against permitting
a jailbreaking exemption in its response to the EFF's proposal. It
claimed that any circumvention exemption:
will destroy the technological protection of Apple's key
copyrighted computer programs in the iPhone device it-
self and of copyrighted content owned by Apple that
plays on the iPhone, resulting in copyright infringement,
potential damage to the device and other potential harm-
ful physical effects, adverse effects on the functioning of
the device, and breach of contract."' 20
Apple also broadly argued that the EFF has not met its "burden of proof
for demonstrating harm to non-infringing uses of the copyrighted works"
protected by the iPhone TPMs, and that no interoperability exemption is
necessary because interoperability is already explicitly addressed in
§ 1201(f) of the DMCA. 121
Apple's position is that the EFF's argument is really an attack on
Apple's business choices on the basis of inappropriate economic and so-
cial considerations. 122 It views the EFF's proposed exemption as an at-
tempt to acquire government approval for transforming the proprietary
computing platform into one capable of using third-party applications
without demonstrating how such a change would "increase innovation or
118 Id. at 12 (quoting 2006 RECOMMENDATION, supra note 79, at 52).
119 See EFF COMMENT, supra note 28, at 12.
120 DAVID L. HAYES, APPLE INC., RESPONSIVE COMMENT IN OPPOSITION TO PROPOSED
EXEMPTION 5A AND 11A 2 (2009), available at http://www.copyright.gov/1201/2008/re-
sponses/apple-inc-31 .pdf [hereinafter APPLE COMMENT].
121 See id. at 2. Note that this paper has not distinguished between the iPhone OS
software code that is stored on the read-only system memory and the "hardware-level" code
such as the boofloader. The EFF's comments refer to the sum of these creations as iPhone
firmware. Apple appears to distinguish the operating system from code like the bootloader but
describes both as computer programs. Id. at 6-7 (describing the iPhone OS and the boot-
loader). Here, such distinctions should not have an impact, though it is worth pointing out the
distinction since Apple makes one in its comments, and since Figure 1 refers to several pro-
grams (SecureBoot, LLB, and iBoot) that may or may not come within the scope of what
Apple defines as the bootloader. Id. at 11-13.
122 See id.
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investment in creative works."' 2 3 Apple's position is that a decision by
the Copyright Office would be inappropriate because the office is not
qualified or supposed to consider the social value of business arrange-
ments.124 Even if the Copyright Office were to consider economic or
social arguments, Apple argued that the EFF failed to establish that a
jailbreaking exemption would have such a result and then stated that the
exemption would actually be quite detrimental to the iPhone experi-
ence.' 25 The following sections examine Apple's responses to the EFF's
claims regarding 17 U.S.C. § 117, eligibility for fair use, and the
§ 1201(a)(1)(C) anti-circumvention factors.
1. Section 117
Apple argued that the EFF incorrectly applied § 117(a) to the
iPhone for four reasons. 126 First, although no court has directly consid-
ered the issue, Apple pointed to a report,127 used by nearly all courts
examining § 117(a) issues, that states that § 117(a) rights may be ne-
gated by contract law.128 A jailbreaking exemption would harm Apple
because jailbreaking violates the rights reserved in Apple's software
licenses. 129
Second, Apple noted that jailbreaking tools, including the iPhone
Dev Team's PwnageTool, do not modify the consumer's own copy of the
iPhone OS.130 Instead, some of these tools install a previously prepared
iPhone OS modification that is incorporated into a copy of the jailbreak-
ing software. 131 Thus, the modified iPhone OS installed by these tools is
not licensed to the numerous people who then download it and use it to
modify their iPhones. Apple argues that these tools violate § 117(a) be-
cause that section requires the owners of a copy of a computer program
to either make the adaptation themselves or authorize the making of the
123 See id.
124 See id. at 3.
125 See id.
126 See id. at 13.
127 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON NEW TECHNOLOGICAL USES OF COPYRIGHTED WORKS, Fi-
NAL REPORT 13-14 (1978) [hereinafter CONTU Report].
128 See APPLE COMMENT, supra note 120, at 14.
129 See id.
130 See id.
131 See id. There is a distinction between modifying a copy of the iPhone OS licensed to
you and modifying a copy of the software licensed to someone else and then shared with
others. While both copies are identical, sharing a modified version of your own copy of the
OS with someone else, even if they legally possess their owned licensed copy, might be
viewed as a violation of copyright law. See, e.g., UMG Recordings, Inc. v. MP3.Com, Inc., 92
F. Supp. 2d 349, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (stating that it is a "presumptive case of infringement"
for a company to stream songs from its own copy of an album with individuals who also have
their own copy of the same album).
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adaptation on their behalf.' 32 Furthermore, Apple pointed out that ac-
cording to § 117(a), adaptations "may be transferred only with the au-
thorization of the copyright owner."' 133 Apple has not authorized these
uses.
Third, recent § 117 opinions have permitted some software adapta-
tion in order to add certain features.13" A limitation on this right is that it
may "only be exercised so long as [the modifications do] not harm the
interest of the copyright proprietor." 135 Apple raised numerous concerns
with the potential for adverse hardware effects from modified software:
ensuring users have a "consistently good experience with the product";
handling support issues related to jailbroken iPhones, which increase call
volume and the overall cost of its support infrastructure; and coping with
the diminished value of the iPhone to Apple and third-party developers
now that jailbroken phones can run unauthorized pirated copies of copy-
righted software. 136
Fourth, Apple pointed to Krause where the court stated, "[w]hether
a questioned use is a use in another manner seems to us to depend on the
type of use envisioned in the creation of the program."' 137 Apple noted
that it designed its system to function in a manner that preserves opera-
tional integrity and avoids the "many potential problems that unautho-
rized modifications cause." 138
2. Fair Use
With regard to the first fair use factor, the purpose and character of
the use, 13 9 Apple noted that although individual use of a modified iPhone
is a personal use, such use is not transformative, and should be consid-
ered a commercial use because jailbroken phones are often used to play
pirated content that would otherwise only be available by purchasing a
licensed copy. 140 Based on these alleged facts, Apple argued that the
first factor weighs against fair use.
132 See APPLE COMMENT, supra note 120, at 14 (citing Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d
119, 122 (2d Cir. 2005)).
133 See id. at 15 (citing Midway Mfg. Co. v. Strohon, 564 F. Supp. 741, 745 n.2 (N.D. Ill.
1983) ("Section 117 'is not authority for [defendant's] sales of reproductions of [plaintiff's]
program as adapted."').
134 See id.
135 Id. (citing Krause, 402 F.3d at 129).
136 See id. at 16.
137 Id. at 17 (citing Krause, 402 F.3d at 129).
138 APPLE COMMENT, supra note 120, at 17.
139 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006); see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
140 See APPLE COMMENT, supra note 120, at 17 (citing Wall Data Inc. v. L.A. County
Sherriff's Dep't, 447 F.3d 769, 778-79 (9th Cir. 2006)). In Wall Data v. L.A. County Sherijffs
Dep't, the Ninth Circuit found a commercial use where the party copied software licensed for
one computer onto many computers. id. Apple argued that because jailbreaking can enable
piracy that is not possible on an unmodified iPhone, the fact that some people use jailbroken
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For the second fair use factor, the nature of the copyrighted work,
and the third factor, the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, 41 Apple stated that the
iPhone OS is highly creative in nature and jailbreaking modifications
involve copying nearly the entire work. 142 Thus, these two factors weigh
against finding fair use.' 43 For the fourth fair use factor, the effect of the
use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work,1 "
Apple restated its arguments regarding the harm that jailbreaking does to
its interests and how this diminishes the value of the iPhone OS for
Apple. 45
In addition, Apple responded to some of the EFF's fair use asser-
tions. 146 In particular, Apple argued that the claim that the iPhone OS
has no independent economic value 147 is misleading since the iPhone OS
is not a product but a component of the "iPhone mobile computing prod-
uct."'1 48 Apple noted that the iPhone OS's value is as software for the
iPhone platform, and that the value of the iPhone OS software is a func-
tion of the number and quality of apps developed for the iPhone de-
vice.149 Apple believes that incentivizing the creation of a high volume
of quality apps is a function of the protections provided by the iPhone
OS, which ensure safe and secure app distribution.15 0 Apple finished its
fair use discussion by stating that the EFF's proposed exemption lacks
any evidence that an exemption permitting removal of Apple's TPMs
will produce a net societal benefit by increasing investment in copy-
righted works as compared to Apple's current iPhone strategy.
15
'
3. Section 1201(a)(1)(C) Factors
Prior to discussing the weight of the fair use factors, Apple re-
sponded to the EFF's characterization of the 2006 mobile phone unlock-
ing exemption 152 by arguing that the EFF has construed a meaning that
ignores the original context. 153 In particular, Apple views the exemption
iPhones to run pirated software is sufficient to show an analogous commercial nature similar to
the one present in Wall Data. Id. There is clearly a difference between the acts at issue in
Wall Data and the mixture of potential problems with jailbreaking.
141 17 U.S.C. § 107; see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
142 See APPLE COMMENT, supra note 120, at 17.
143 See id.
144 17 U.S.C. § 107; see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
145 See APPLE COMMENT, supra note 120, at 18.
146 See id.
147 See EFF COMMENT, supra note 28, at 9.




152 See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
153 See APPLE COMMENT, supra note 120, at 21.
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narrowly and believes it only applies where the TPM does not protect a
copyrighted work. 154 Apple views its TPMs as protecting its copyright
interest in the iPhone OS, along with its overall interest in maintaining
product integrity. 155
For the first factor, 156 the availability for use of copyrighted works,
Apple argued the availability for non-infringing purposes will not be im-
pacted because the acts at issue in the proposed exemption are infring-
ing. 157 Apple also argued that the TPMs at issue here promote the
creation of copyrighted works. 158 First, the TPMs ensure integrity, and
that incentivizes Apple and its potential competitors to produce products
like the iPhone which may otherwise be more expensive to support. 159
Second, the TPMs support the iPhone ecosystem which incentivizes de-
velopment of creative works (apps) by providing infrastructure for devel-
opment, distribution, and monetization.1 60 Apple noted that it reviews
submitted apps to ensure that they meet certain standards and that they
do not present any security or compatibility issues. 161
For the second factor, 162 the availability for use of works for non-
profit, archival, preservation, and educational purposes, Apple argued
that the harms discussed in the previous factor may have a detrimental
effect on the availability concerns for this factor. 163 Those harms will
decrease incentives for the creation of products like the iPhone and
software that runs on those devices. 164 With a lower output of creations,
the sum of works available for nonprofit archival, preservation, and edu-
cational purposes may be harmed. 165
Apple then went on to argue each remaining factor either weighed
in its favor or should have no weight. For the third factor, 166 the impact
on criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching, scholarship, or re-
154 See id.
155 See id. at 22; supra note 130 and accompanying text.
156 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)(i) (2006); see supra note 80 and accompanying text.
157 See APPLE COMMENT, supra note 120, at 22.
158 See id.
159 See id. In other words, Apple believes that if the costs related to the use of the iPhone
are increased for creators like Apple, fewer companies may enter the market or attempt to
create similar products. Id. The value of the iPhone and its OS is reduced if Apple must bear
the cost of support infrastructure and customer calls that relate to problems stemming from
undesired jailbreaking modifications. Id. Apple states that this is already a problem, and that
the problem may only get worse if the Library of Congress were to permit a jailbreaking
exemption. Id.
t60 See id. at 23.
161 See id. at 24.
162 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)(ii) (2006); see supra note 80 and accompanying text.
163 See APPLE COMMENT, supra note 120, at 25.
164 See id. at 22-24.
165 See id. at 25.
166 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)(iii); see supra note 80 and accompanying text.
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search, Apple agreed with the EFF that a jailbreaking exemption would
have little impact on these factors.167 For the fourth factor,168 the effect
on the market for, or value of, copyrighted works, Apple referenced its
prior discussion 169 arguing that jailbreaking will reduce the incentives for
the creation of copyrighted works like the iPhone OS, as well as other
works like apps which, without proper protections, are more likely to be
pirated by iPhone users.170 For the remaining catch-all factors,1 71 Apple
argued it might be unwise to create an interoperability exemption since
Congress has already spoken on the issue in § 1201(f).172 Apple ends its
discussion by re-emphasizing that it believes the EFF has failed to
demonstrate the required harm. 173
C. Other Views on the Proposed Exemption
Since the exemption process is ongoing and many of the filings and
comments discussed here have only been available for a matter of
months, there is little available scholarship on the proposed exemp-
tion. 174 One author, Ryan Witte, argues that an exemption should be
granted based solely on a fair use analysis. 175
Specifically, Witte argues that three of the four fair use factors
weigh in favor of a jailbreaking exemption. 176 For the first fair use fac-
tor, the purpose and character of the use, 177 Witte aligns with the EFF in
arguing that the nature of the use is personal, and since jailbreaking
software, like PwnageTool, is distributed without any financial gain, the
factor should favor a fair use exemption. 178
As to the second fair use factor, the nature of the copyrighted
work, 179 Witte compares iPhone TPMs to the protections at issue in
Lexmark Int'l Inc. v. Static Control.180 Witte argues that to the extent
167 See APPLE COMMENT, supra note 120, at 25.
168 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)(iv); see supra note 80 and accompanying text.
169 See APPLE COMMENT, supra note 120, at 12.
170 See id. at 25.
171 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(C)(v); see supra note 80 and accompanying text.
172 See APPLE COMMENT, supra note 120, at 25.
173 See id. at 25-26. The requisite harm issue is outside of the scope of this Note and so
the details of the EFF's and Apple's claims regarding the related burden are omitted.
174 As of February 19, 2010, the Library of Congress has yet to publish its rulemaking; it
was originally due at the end of October 2009.
175 Ryan Benjamin Witte, Breaking Out of Section 1201(a) Liability: Why Jailbreaking
the iPhone Constitutes Fair Use Under Copyright, (unpublished working paper), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id= 1371863.
176 See id. at 11.
177 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (2006); see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
178 See Witte, supra note 175, at 4-5.
179 17 U.S.C. § 107(2); see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
180 387 F.3d 522 (6th Cir. 2004) (concluding that a computer 'lock-out' code falls outside
of the protections of copyright law and the DMCA partly because of the merger doctrine
which precludes copyright protection from works where the idea, which is not generally pro-
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that Apple's iPhone OS is similar to the lock-out mechanisms in
Lexmark, the nature of the iPhone OS suggests it deserves little protec-
tion.181 Finally, the author argues that "in order to avoid overly broad
copyright protection at the expense of non-infringing uses, the Librarian
[of Congress] should find that the incorporation of Apple's [iPhone OS]
constitutes fair use."' 182
For the third factor, the amount of the copyrighted work used, 183
Witte admits that virtually all of Apple's software is copied and re-used
as part of the jailbreaking process, but he suggests this use "will neither
impact the market for the original firmware, nor the iPhone itself."1 84
Discussing the fourth factor, the effect on the market for the copy-
righted work, 185 Witte essentially sides with the EFF's view that the
iPhone OS has no independent economic value. 186 The author argues
that demand for the iPhone device will not decrease if jailbreaking is
permitted, and the market will not be harmed as a result.
187
IV. ANALYSIS
While each side has raised significant concerns regarding whether
the Library of Congress should grant the proposed exemption, prior judi-
cial opinions and Library of Congress rulemakings suggest that the pro-
posed exemption will be denied. From a policy perspective, this Note
argues such a result may have negative implications for owners of
tethered devices, such as the iPhone. More broadly, this Note argues that
current interpretations of the DMCA may be a threat to the innovation
the law was arguably intended to protect. Regardless, the courts and the
Library of Congress have interpreted the Congressional mandate under
the DMCA as weighing strongly in favor of copyright holders when it
comes to balancing the rights of creators and consumers and the Library
is unlikely to exempt the proposed class.
This final section of the paper will discuss potential harms to con-
sumers and Apple and will then review past judicial decisions and Li-
brary of Congress rulemakings as a component of an analysis of the legal
landscape. Finally, this section will conclude with a brief policy discus-
sion raising concerns about the impact of the DMCA.
tectable under copyright, cannot be otherwise separated from the author's expression); see
Witte, supra note 175, at 6-8.
181 See Witte, supra note 175, at 6-8.
182 Id. at 8.
183 17 U.S.C. § 107(3); see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
184 Witte, supra note 175, at 8-9.
185 17 U.S.C. § 107(4); see supra note 95 and accompanying text.
186 See Witte, supra note 175, at 10.
187 See id.
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A. Consumer Harm
The EFF's proposed exemption comments, as well as other com-
ments submitted to the Library of Congress, demonstrate that some con-
sumers have a strong interest in running legitimately obtained third-party
apps on their mobile devices. At the time of the EFF's initial finding in
December 2008, it stated an estimated 350,000 consumers had jailbroken
their phones and utilized Cydia, an alternative to Apple's App Store that
sells licensed apps that may otherwise be unavailable through official
channels. 188 While there is no specific data available to show how many
jailbroken iPhones are used to run pirated apps, it is clear that there are
legitimate pro-copyright reasons for permitting jailbreaking. 189
Additionally, some individuals submitted comments to the Library
of Congress describing the particular legitimate ways they wish to use
their mobile devices. 190 For example, Joseph Hall wrote to explain his
desire to run a video app that Apple has refused to sell through its App
Store.191 He uses a jailbroken iPhone to make short video clips as a part
of his research for a major university. 192 While one could argue he
should just buy a video camera or buy the latest version of the iPhone
capable of playing video out of the box, it is understandable for a con-
sumer to want to use his lawfully owned device in a convenient manner
especially given that the original iPhone is capable of operating as a
video camera. Furthermore, it is difficult to argue that this particular use
does any harm to Apple's interest. In this instance, Apple has made
money from selling the iPhone device to Mr. Hall, and Mr. Hall is better
off because he is able to take advantage of the device's capabilities in
order to make his research easier. It is likely that consumers like Mr.
Hall may have a greater demand for the iPhone device because of the
availability of unapproved third-party apps.
188 EFF COMMENT, supra note 28, at 7 (citing Erica Sadun, The Story Behind Cydia on
the iPhone, ARs TECHNICA, Oct. 8, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/journals/apple.ars/2008/1O/08/
the-story-behind-cydia-on-the-iphone)).
189 See, e.g., Sadun, supra note 188 (discussing the various apps available through Cydia
that cannot be sold through Apple because they offer features which Apple does not permit).
190 See Responses to Comments, Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of Copy-
right Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, http://www.copyright.gov/1201/
2008/responses/index.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2010).
191 Letter from Joseph Lorenzo Hall, Ph.D, Center for Information Technology Policy, to
Office of the General Counsel, U.S. Copyright Office (Jan. 30, 2009), available at http://www.
copyright.gov/1201/2008/responses/j oseph-hall-09.pdf.
192 Id. While the newer iPhone 3GS model is capable of recording videos out of the box,
Apple does not list the original iPhone as capable of recording video. See iPhone 3GS Techni-
cal Specifications, http://www.apple.com/iphone/specs.html (last visited Mar. 8, 2010); iPhone
3G Technical Specifications, http://www.apple.comiphone/specs-3g.html (last visited Mar. 8,
2010).
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B. Potential Harm to Apple
While people, like Mr. Hall, may have a clear and understandable
interest in jailbreaking their iPhone devices, Apple posits that its own
interests will be adversely impacted if the Library of Congress exempts
jailbreaking. 193 As Apple argues, it has a strong interest in maintaining a
consistent user experience and in reducing support costs. 1 94 While the
argument that jailbreaking increases support costs makes sense, it is not
clear if a court would find a proximate relationship between copyright
interests and the harm this places on Apple.
Apple has strong interests in providing a consistent user experience.
It markets the iPhone by focusing on the many apps the device can
play. 195 Although the iPhone may feel like a full-featured computing
device, Apple had to make design choices including balancing the size of
the unit, size of the battery, operating speed of the processor, and the
amount of volatile high-speed memory (RAM). 196 While consumers
may want a small and responsive phone with great battery life, these
factors often conflict with each other, leading manufacturers to make
compromises. One such compromise on the iPhone is to virtually ban
the running of apps in the background. 197 Desktop computer users take
for granted the ability to have many programs running simultaneously
(multitasking). For example, a consumer may write a paper using a word
processing program while running an instant messaging program in the
background. Computer users often switch back and forth between these
types of applications, however, this capability requires more memory and
processing power than if only one application is run at a time. For the
iPhone, Apple chose to limit background processing making it impossi-
ble to multitask. If a desktop computer worked like this, it would mean
193 While completely speculative, it is possible that an exemption may have little real-
world impact. Many iPhone owners have jailbroken their phones already, unaware of or de-
spite potential legal consequences. See EFF COMMENT at 5 (noting that over 350,000 users had
jailbroken their phones as of fall 2008). It may be the case then that an official exemption will
lead to minimal change in the demand for jailbreaking. Creators like Apple will likely caution
about the risks of these activities and are able to keep many consumers in check by voiding
their warranties if they jailbreak. At the same time, many developers may see jailbreaking as
an opportunity to develop programs outside of Apple's restrictions on features. These new
apps may drive consumer demand for jailbreaking.
194 See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
195 See, e.g., Press Release, Apple Inc., App Store Downloads Top 100 Million World-
wide (Sept. 9, 2008), available at http:llwww.apple.comlprlibrary/200/Ol909appstore.html.
196 See, e.g., Mark Burgess & Frode Eika Sandnes, A Promise Theory Approach to Col-
laborative Power Reduction in a Pervasive Computing Environment, in LEaCrUR NoTEs IN
COMPUTER SCIENCE 616 (Aug. 25, 2006), available at http://www.springerlink.comlcontent/t6
69g12u50r71008/ (describing the problems stemming from the relationship between battery life
and processor usage).
197 See Rob Griffiths, Some Background on Background Processes, MACWORLD.COM,
Jun. 10, 2008, http://www.macworld.conarticle/133867/2008/06/backgroundprocesses.html.
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consumers would have to save and quit their word processor before
opening and signing into their instant messaging client to converse with a
colleague. 198
The iPhone likely has these types of restrictions on multitasking, as
well as restrictions on the use of certain apps, because Apple wants to
ensure consumers experience great battery life and fast response from the
iPhone device and its apps. In order to create this positive user experi-
ence, Apple chose to place limits on the iPhone's operations. If jail-
breaking were permitted, memory hogging third-party apps or other
iPhone OS modifications may increase features with the effect of de-
creasing battery life or straining the processor in ways that take away
from the quick response time Apple intended as part of the positive
iPhone experience.1 99
Finally, Apple has a strong interest in reducing app piracy. While
jailbreaking on its own does not interfere with the TPMs designed to
prevent copying of apps distributed through the App store, jailbreaking is
a necessary step on the road to running pirated apps. People like Mr.
Hall demonstrate that there are legitimate reasons to allow users to
download and run apps from sources other than Apple's App Store. 2°°
Unfortunately, opening the door to permit developers to distribute their
apps outsides of Apple's official channel also means unlocking part of
the protections designed to prevent users from running pirated apps,
which could hurt developers and may lower overall incentives for app
development. Apple's "ecosystem" provides strong incentives for devel-
opers to produce apps because it is safe and secure. Owners of iPhones
who have not jailbroken their devices have no way to run pirated apps,
and these restrictions help to ensure apps are only acquired through Ap-
ple's legitimate channel. While this system may reduce iPhone users'
choices regarding where to purchase their apps or what types of apps
they can use on their iPhone, it also creates strong incentives for the
production of copyrighted works (apps). As the volume of apps in-
198 Users of MS-DOS or early versions of Microsoft Windows may be familiar with this
scenario.
199 When using an Apple Macintosh computer or a PC running a version of Microsoft
Windows, there are times when everything slows down-video playback may appear choppy
or scrolling in a web browser may no longer appear smooth. This type of behavior may be the
result of using too many programs at once and it likely affects how consumers view their
computing experience. It is possible that Apple wished to limit these negative experiences on
the iPhone by placing limits on running multiple programs simultaneously. Likely due to
these concerns, Google's Android OS has a policy of permitting multi-tasking but with the
understanding that the phone may close background applications when the system needs to
free up memory or processing time. See Peter Bright, Leaked: WinPhone 7 Series Dev to Use
Almost All Managed Code, ARs TECHNICA, Feb. 19, 2010, http://arstechnica.comnimicrosoft/
news/2010/02/windows-phone-7-series-development-kit-info-leaks.ars.
200 See Hall, supra note 191 and accompanying text.
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creases, the value of the iPhone increases for consumers because each
app essentially adds new capabilities or features to the phone. The re-
sulting increased demand for iPhones and its accompanying iPhone OS
creates value for Apple because of a higher volume of iPhone sales. Jail-
breaking may lessen the incentives that Apple has created for developers
to create new apps.
C. Legal Arguments
While the concerns of the public and Apple have great importance
in this debate, the outcome of the proposed exemption will depend on the
law and not on public and private interests directly. In particular, Apple
and the EFF have made some questionable claims regarding 17 U.S.C.
§ 117, fair use, and the likely final outcome for the proposed exemption.
1. Section 117
The EFF and Apple both make questionable claims regarding § 117;
however, Apple's argument more closely fits with the court's views in
Krause v. Titleserv, Inc.20 1 While Apple's overall argument may be
stronger, it makes a weak argument regarding the ability to negate the
§ 117(a) adaptation right by contract. Regardless of the outcome of this
issue, the EFF fails to demonstrate how jailbreaking could fall within the
scope of the § 117(a) adaptation right if Apple's very aim was to prohibit
these types of modifications. 202
In order for § 117 to apply, Krause states that while the possessor of
the program need not be the original creator or owner of the work, there
must be "sufficient incidents of ownership over a copy of the program to
be sensibly considered the owner of the copy."'20 3 In other words, one
threshold requirement for § 117 is that the user must own the particular
copy of the work at issue. Apple claims that it has contractually limited
the adaptation rights of all users.20 4 Apple relies on the CONTU Report,
which states that copyright owners may elect to contractually prohibit
adaptations. 20 5 Apple points out that § 117 cases extensively cite the
CONTU report, but courts have never addressed this issue directly. 2
0 6
Further, at least one case suggests in dicta that even where there is a
contract, the creator's right to exclude adaptation by contract is not abso-
201 402 F.3d 119 (2d Cir. 2005).
202 See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
203 Krause, 402 F.3d at 124.
204 APPLE CoMMENT, supra note 120, at 13-14.
205 CONTU Report, supra note 127, at 13-14.
206 See APPLE CoMMENT, supra note 120, at 14.
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lute.20 7 The outcome of Apple's contract negation argument is unclear
given the lack of a definitive judicial holding.
While Apple's claims regarding contracting around § 117 might be
correct, its arguments regarding the scope of permissible adaptations is
more in line with caselaw. Here, the EFF argues:
The court in Krause v. Titleserv also recognized that
§ 117(a) permits the owner of a copy of a computer pro-
gram not only to make additional copies, but also to
adapt those copies to add new capabilities, so long as the
changes do not 'harm the interests of the copyright pro-
prietor.' Where jailbreaking is concerned, the changes
to the [iPhone OS] are made solely in order to facilitate
the interoperability of the phone with third-party appli-
cations, and the resulting modified firmware is used on
the phone on which the firmware was originally
installed. 20 8
The first issue with the EFF's argument is that real harms will result
if the Library exempts jailbreaking. Apple has understandable concerns
regarding maintaining a consistent and high quality user experience that
may be tarnished by processor-hungry programs causing the iPhone to
run slowly or significantly reduce the device's battery life. Further, Ap-
ple correctly points out that the Krause court believed the scope of per-
missible adaptations depends on the "use envisioned in the creation of
the program. '20 9 In Krause, the program at issue was a business records
management program. 210 The permitted modifications included making
changes to reflect the current business operational needs of the owner of
the copy of the program.211 The iPhone and the jailbreaking adaptation
seem significantly different considering that the iPhone was always
locked-down to ensure that only Apple-approved code may be executed.
Apple designed the iPhone OS with the specific intent of maintaining
operational integrity, including through the restrictions on the use of non-
App Store apps. If this view of Apple's envisioned use of the iPhone OS
is correct, it is hard to imagine that an adaptation which destroys these
protections could fall within the scope of adaptations permitted under
§ 117.
207 Foresight Res. Corp. v. Pfortmiller, 719 F. Supp. 1006, 1010 (D. Kan. 1989).
208 EFF CoMMENTrr, supra note 28, at 9.
209 APPLE CoMMENT, supra note 120, at 17 (citing Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119,
129 (2d Cir. 2005)).
210 Krause v. Titleserv, Inc., 402 F.3d 119, 120 (2d Cir. 2005).
211 Id.
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2. Fair Use
While the EFF makes some strong points in its fair use argument,
the DMCA exemption will likely be denied independent of whether the
Library of Congress agrees with Apple or the EFF with regard to fair
use. 212 Even the EFF and Witte' S213 respective fair use arguments, how-
ever, are not ironclad. Both make questionable claims regarding the
fourth fair use factor, the effect of the use upon the potential market for
or value of the copyrighted work.2 14 The EFF argued that the fourth
factor favors fair use: "Insofar as smart phone makers do not copy or
distribute [the iPhone OS] separately from the smart phones themselves,
the jailbreaking activities of individual phone owners cannot harm the
market for the phone/[iPhone OS] bundle. '215
The EFF continues to argue that the iPhone OS has no independent
economic value separate from the iPhone.2 16 This argument ignores the
incentives Apple has created through the many TPMs used on the iPhone
in order to provide an environment where it is easy to monetize apps and
impossible to run pirated copies. To the extent that the iPhone's value
depends on the number and quality of apps available for use, it seems
that activities like jailbreaking would decrease incentives to create new
apps and that this decrease would lower the value of the iPhone. While
the EFF may be correct that some specific consumers, such as Mr.
Hall,2 17 will be more likely to demand the iPhone if allowed to jailbreak,
the aggregate effect of jailbreaking may have deleterious effects on the
current incentives to create apps and on the value of the iPhone OS.
3. DMCA
Whether Apple or the EFF are correct in their arguments regarding
fair use and § 117, the proposed exemption may still fail because of the
wide scope of its applicability. The proposed exemption would apply to
smart phones generally and not just the iPhone. Furthermore, virtually
all consumers would fall within the class of users permitted to jailbreak.
The problem with such a wide scope is that the design of each smart
phone may vary substantially, and possibly, the steps necessary for jail-
breaking may also compromise otherwise protected software and media.
The fact that jailbreaking some devices may potentially compromise
212 See supra Part RI (discussing the likely problems with the scope of the proposed
class).
213 See Witte, supra note 175.
214 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2006).
215 EFF COMMENT, supra note 28, at 9.
216 Id.
217 See Hall, supra note 191 and accompanying text.
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TPMs aimed at preventing the copying of protected media may be a dis-
positive factor for the Library. 218
In previous rulings, the Library of Congress has addressed issues
analogous to the proposed jailbreaking exemption. Perhaps the strongest
and most recent example comes from the 2006 rulemaking. That
rulemaking denied a proposed exemption for playing region-coded
DVDs.219 Commercial movies distributed on DVD are classified by geo-
graphical region.220 For example, DVDs purchased in North America
are in Region 1 and those sold in China are in Region 6.221 DVDs and
DVD players sold in each region share the same Region code, and DVD
players are only supposed to play DVDs for one region. Just as the
iPhone will play Apple authorized apps only, a Region 1 DVD player
will play DVDs coded for Region 1 only. Also, some movies may be
released in one region but not in others. 222 The result of these complica-
tions is that American viewers may be unable to watch certain movies
that have not been released for Region 1. This restriction on the ability
to play the movies that one wants is quite similar to the jailbreaking
interest in playing apps of all kinds independent of Apple's approval.
The Register of Copyrights denied an exemption for region-coded DVD
in part because of a finding that alternatives existed for playing DVDs
from other regions, including buying a second DVD player with the de-
sired region code.2 23 Additionally, the Register of Copyrights viewed
the restriction as an inconvenience and not a harm because of available
alternatives. 224 Perhaps the Register of Copyrights will recommend that
people like Mr. Hall, who wish to make videos with their iPhones, just
buy a video camera or a newer iPhone model instead.225
A second analogous use that has not been addressed directly by the
Register of Copyrights, but that has been considered in court, is mod
chips for video game systems. Mod chips are computer chips which can
be soldered to video game systems in order to defeat the copy protection
218 2006 RECOMMENDATION, supra note 79, at 52.
219 See id. at 74.
220 See id.
221 See generally ROBERT C. BIRO & SUBHASH C. JAIN, THE GLOBAL CHALLENGE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2008) (discussing the use of regional codes to prevent the
viewing of pirated DVDs).
222 For example, a 2001 Washington Post article noted that "immigrants who want to
watch movies from their home, language students and foreign film enthusiasts," are some of
the groups that are negatively impacted by the region code system and sometimes resort to the
use of banned multiregion DVD players. James C. Luh, Breaking Down DVD Borders, WASH.
POST, June 1, 200 1, http://www.washingtonpost.comac2/wp-dyn/A5310-2001 May3 1.
223 2006 RECOMMENDATION, supra note 79, at 75.
224 See id. at 75-76.
225 See Hall, supra note 191.
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measures.2 26 These chips defeat video game system TPMs that block the
system from running copied game discs, games intended for a different
geographical market (similar to DVD Region Codes), and also unli-
censed third-party software. Just as Apple uses TPMs to block the use of
non-App Store programs, video game manufacturers such as Sony have
used TPMs to ensure only Sony-authorized software can be run on its
machines.2 27  In Sony Computer Entertainment America, Inc. v.
Filipiak,228 the court found an individual liable for distributing mod
chips in violation of the DMCA. 229 Because the protections defeated
through jailbreaking are similar to those defeated by mod chips, Filipiak
provides further support for the argument that the proposed jailbreaking
exemption will be denied.
4. Policy: Innovation Incentives
While I argue Apple is likely to prevail in its quest to quash the
proposed jailbreaking exemption, I do not believe this outcome, which
comports with contemporary interpretations of the DMCA, is necessarily
the best result for the public. While the iPhone's closed model has at-
tracted consumers and developers in a manner that appears to have raised
consumer interest in the smartphone market, it has also arguably hin-
dered the development of valuable disruptive technical innovation.
The goal of the anti-circumvention provisions is in part to ensure
that content creators will continue to control the digital distribution of
their media (music, movies, software, etc.). According to a U.S. Copy-
right Office Summary, the anti-circumvention provision and its associ-
ated causes of actions, "provide legal protection that the international
copyright community deemed critical to the safe and efficient exploita-
tion of works on digital networks. ' '230 In other words, legislators likely
felt the enactment of the DMCA was necessary to protect copyright hold-
ers so that they will continue to have incentives to produce new creative
works. While such an aim, if achievable, seems laudable, it is ironic that
the DMCA can be relied upon to exclude those who wish to create new
and innovative software for locked-down devices like the iPhone.231 In a
226 See Phillip A. Harris, Jr., Mod Chips and Homebrew: A Recipe for Their Continued
Use in Wake of Sony v. Divineo, 9 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 113, 115-16 (2007).
227 See id.
228 406 F. Supp. 2d 1068 (N.D. Cal. 2005).
229 Id. at 1076-77.
230 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SUMMARY OF THE DIGITAL MILLENNIUM COPYRIGHT ACT 3
(1998), available at http://www.copyright.gov/1egislation/dmca.pdf.
231 See, e.g., Roi Carthy, Tawkon Measures the Radiation Spewing From Your iPhone.
No Wonder Apple Doesn't Approve It, TECHCRUNCH, Mar. 4, 2010, http://techcrunch.com/
2010/03/04/tawkon-iphone-radiation (discussing a software company's inability to get Apple's
approval for an app which attempts to predict the level of radiation emitted by the phone
depending on various factors such as the specific model and location of the device).
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closed environment, developers may not be able to release highly desira-
ble software if the controlling party, in this case Apple, refuses to give
them permission. While a closed model, may offer certain protections
and conveniences, it may be bad for innovation, since the controlling
party can serve as a gatekeeper, and the consumer's interests are not
necessarily aligned with companies like Apple. 232
While the DMCA provides legal muscle in support of Apple's con-
trolled iPhone business model, it does so at the expense of other develop-
ers who might, in the absence of a gatekeeper like Apple, be incentivized
to produce tomorrow's innovations.
CONCLUSION
It is unfortunate that some iPhone users are unable to run certain
apps because Apple has chosen not to distribute them. From the stand-
point of consumers, the iPhone would be even better if a fully-featured
Skype App were available. Furthermore, as discussed just prior to this
final section, permitting a jailbreaking exemption might be a net societal
benefit. Perhaps the problems of app piracy are not as substantial as
Apple suspects, and a jailbreaking exemption will make Apple, develop-
ers, and iPhone consumers all better off. While the EFF believes this is
the correct way to interpret the proposed exemption, it ignores the draco-
nian all or nothing Congressional mandate under the DMCA. The world
of black box233 technologies no longer exists as imagined when DMCA
was enacted. In its place is a world filled with software-restricting
software. Organizations like the EFF devote substantial resources to
fighting for DMCA exemptions in an attempt to bring balance to copy-
right law. While such fights may be commendable, the underlying prob-
lem, if there is one, is with the DMCA itself.
232 Consider the Skype app discussed supra notes 1-10 and accompanying text. While
consumers would likely prefer to make Skype phone calls using their mobile carrier's data
network, ultimately Apple, not Skype or iPhone users, decides whether to allow the distribu-
tion of a more full-featured version of the app.
233 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
